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PREFACE 
Transition to low-carbon and renewable energy systems—from the shutting down of high-
emitting power plants to the deployment of both large-scale and distributed wind and 
solar—is driving unprecedented changes in power systems. In particular, the increase in 
electricity supply variability calls into question the traditional approach of balancing 
electricity demand and supply by relying only on supply-side resources, such as imports, 
peak and flexible generators, and pumped-hydro storage. Adding more flexibility on the 
demand side, via demand response, is emerging as an important tool to optimally support a 
power system with increased supply-side variability.  
Demand response (DR) is a set of demand-side activities that provide an array of grid 
balancing services, including equilibrating demand and grid losses with supply. Because DR 
can facilitate the integration of renewable energy sources, marked by intermittency, there 
is also widespread consensus that DR can reduce the carbon-intensity and cost of power 
systems. Yet, the deployment of DR is stymied, in large part, by market and regulatory 
barriers as well as technological uncertainties, particularly technological developments, 
such as electrical energy storage, which can either complement or compete with DR.  
In the European Union (EU) the importance of DR is reflected in EU Directives. In the United 
States (US) the Energy Policy Act of 2005 and specific Federal Energy Regulatory 
Commission (FERC) rulings set the basis for DR. Furthermore, non-profit organisations such 
as the Smart Energy Demand Coalition (SEDC) in Europe, and the Association for Demand 
Response and Smart Grid (ADS) and the Advanced Energy Management Alliance (AEMA) in 
the US advocate the development of DR. 
DR must be developed competitively, since it involves a continuum of options and actors, 
and its deployment may generate a variety of risks, e.g. investment and regulatory risks, as 
well as short and long-term power-system risks. The perceived benefits of DR also vary 
depending on the stakeholders’ standpoint. Adopting a risk governance approach to DR 
deployment is recommended to better gauge the risks and benefits, and thereby to 
evaluate the extent to which demand response is a viable alternative to investment in 
conventional peak capacity and grid reinforcement, and to unlock barriers to its 
competitive development in an evolving power system. 
It is against this background that IRGC, together with the EPFL Energy Center, organised a 
multi-stakeholder conference and an expert workshop on September 10 – 11, 2015 to shed 
light on the opportunities and challenges for demand response and to identify potential 
solutions, and published a report on “Demand-side Flexibility for Energy Transitions: 
Ensuring the Competitive Development of Demand Response Options,” available at 
https://www.irgc.org/issues/energy-transitions/demand-response/. 
This Policy Brief synthesises the key outstanding issues regarding the use of DR, focusing on 
the context of energy transitions in Western Europe. It is intended for an audience of 
policymakers, regulators and industry, who contemplate DR development. Based on 
international evidence, it urges early consideration of DR, since the implementation of 
policy reforms as well as the redesign of electricity markets take time.  
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ACRONYMS 
ADR  Automated Demand Response 
BRP  Balance Responsible Party 
CAPEX  Capital Expenditure 
CO2  Carbon Dioxide 
C&I  Commercial and Industrial  
DLC  Direct Load Control 
DR   Demand Response 
DSO  Distribution Service Operator 
FERC  Federal Energy Regulatory Commission 
GWAC  GridWise Architecture Council 
ICT   Information and Communication Technology 
LMP  Locational Marginal Price 
OPEX  Operating Expenditure 
PV   Photovoltaic 
SEDC   Smart Energy Demand Coalition  
US AEMA US Advanced Energy Management Alliance 
TSO  Transmission System Operator 
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SUMMARY 
The Policy Brief highlights that increasing flexibility in power systems is needed to 
accommodate higher shares of non-controllable and intermittent renewable generation, and 
that this requires changes to the market design and regulatory framework, to facilitate the 
development and deployment of appropriate technologies and market-based instruments (e.g. 
taxes and subsidies). The Policy Brief focuses on demand response (DR), since it is emerging as 
a powerful demand-side energy management option to deliver flexibility.1 Specifically, DR 
contributes to reducing overall electricity consumption or shifting demand in such a way that 
consumption better follows generation, particularly intermittent wind and solar. In point of 
fact, experts portend that DR could have avoided German utilities huge losses (half a trillion 
Euros2) when, on June 16, 2013, renewable generation exceeded demand and market prices 
went negative.  Furthermore, DR can provide ancillary services for real-time power, frequency 
and voltage regulation. 
In the European Union (EU) and the U.S., the importance of DR is reflected, respectively, in the 
EU Directives—particularly the Electricity Directive (2009/72/EC) and the Energy Efficiency 
Directive (2012/27/EU) —and in the U.S. Energy Policy Act of 2005 as well as specific FERC 
rulings (e.g. FERC Orders 719, 745, 755 and 780). The FERC Order 745 was recently upheld, 
allowing DR operators to pay DR participants the same rates for reducing energy use during 
peak demand hours as those paid to generators. In Europe, EU Directives remain to be 
transposed into national laws in many EU states. To address reliability risks due to growing 
peak demand, France has successfully redesigned its market to actively promote DR to address 
both peak capacity constraints and market liquidity constraints. An important lesson from the 
French case is that to be DR-ready and avoid missed opportunities, countries should initiate 
the redesign process as early as possible, because this can be a complex and lengthy process. 
Demand response overview 
 Enablers of demand response  
Technological advances, particularly in information and communication technology, underpin 
the maturation of DR from a basic peak reduction resource to one providing a full spectrum of 
grid balancing services. And, besides enabling regulatory and policy changes, the emergence of 
active consumers, aggregators and DR advocacy groups have created a need for more 
competitive electricity service offerings, in which DR is a low-hanging fruit.  
 Benefits of demand response 
DR is highly lauded for its potential to reduce CO2 emissions through enabling penetration of 
intermittent renewable sources, particularly by reducing the need for peak and flexible 
conventional generators, mostly gas-fired power plants. DR can also bring economic benefits in 
the form of revenues for services to the grid and potential investment savings in electricity 
generation, transmission and distribution assets. DR has the potential to create broader value 
to society by increasing competition and innovation. Furthermore, as end-user behaviour co-
evolves with DR and new technologies, additional social value will be catalysed.  
 Evolution of demand response  
The development of DR across the world is rather varied, depending on country-specific 
system needs and barriers to deployment. The U.S. has been and still is the leader in DR. Over 
the next decade, the highest DR growth rate is expected in Asia Pacific. Growth will be 
registered in both the Commercial and Industrial (C&I), and residential consumer segments, 
but the latter will still account for only a small share of the market. While DR has been 
primarily used for shaving peak loads, it is increasingly valued for the provision of a wider range 
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of grid services, namely power, frequency and voltage regulation, which are needed to allow 
for increasing reliance on variable renewable resources.  
 Barriers to demand response 
The growth of DR is stymied by uncertainty regarding the feasible potential of DR, due to 
uncertainty about the technical constraints to delivery DR when called, the economic value of 
DR as well as the extent to which consumers will be engaged in DR activities. Furthermore, 
transaction costs borne by DR participants and DR service providers are currently too high and 
preclude the participation of many actors and resources. Besides, incumbent utilities that have 
traditionally provided flexibility from conventional power plants may resist DR or lobby against 
the equal treatment of DR vis-a-vis supply-side flexibility. 
Recommendations: key levers to facilitate DR development 
DR should be recognised as one constituent of power-system flexibility alongside other 
traditional flexibility resources such as flexible generation, power storage and network 
upgrade. Yet streamlining DR in low-carbon power systems involves lengthy processes of 
regulatory, market design, and governance changes. The following five key levers can facilitate 
the timely and competitive DR development.     
Redefining roles and responsibilities. Incumbent utilities perceive electricity market entrants 
such as aggregators as a threat to their businesses. In this context, it is important to specify 
clear framework conditions for DSOs to evolve their role and foster collaboration and strategic 
partnerships to leverage their coordinating role in electricity markets. Furthermore, the 
responsibility for addressing grid imbalances should be increasingly borne by those 
generators—including wind and solar—that cause the imbalances.  
Enabling dynamic and transparent pricing. Pricing is an important element of the market 
design that enables business models to unleash DR capacity, extract and distribute the 
associated value.  Prices have to be deregulated to enable the capture of the full potential of 
DR. In particular, electricity should increasingly be priced at locational marginal price, while 
auctions for DR should be encouraged to ensure efficient price discovery for DR.   
Lifting market entry barriers. Regulation and policy can provide further impetus to DR by 
deregulating and opening markets so that all resources (from both the demand-side and 
supply-side) and actors (incumbents and new entrants, alike) can compete on equal terms. 
Streamlining approval procedures and requirements will reduce transaction costs and open 
market access to broader range of DR resources. It is equally important to manage the 
sequencing of market opening for a smooth and sustainable transformation of power markets.  
Harmonising policies. Regulation should encourage a shift away from capital investment in 
conventional generation units for flexibility provision, and harmonise incentives so that 
different sources of flexibility, including DR, can be synergistically developed. Distortionary 
subsidies to coal should be removed, for instance. Given the need for DR to cost-effectively 
enhance security of supply, in the case of Europe, adequate provision for DR should be made in 
the Network Codes to ensure its timely deployment.  
Adopting a risk management approach. A three-pronged risk management is required. It 
involves first promoting the use of standardised tools for robust evaluation of DR potential. 
Second, the risks and obstacles to the delivery of DR should be assessed and addressed 
upfront. Third, any residual risk, e.g. risk of unscheduled supply disruptions, should be 
addressed via contractual risk transfer mechanisms.  
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1. INTRODUCTION 
The transition to a low-carbon society, in general, requires higher penetration of variable 
renewable generation (wind and solar), both at centralised (utility-scale) and distributed (local) 
levels.  Wind and solar electricity are highly variable and non-controllable weather-dependent 
output. Their integration entails unprecedented power sector challenges, pertaining to the 
intermittent power availability over hourly, daily and seasonal timescales, as well as frequency 
and voltage variability over the sub-second time scale. Addressing those challenges requires a 
full spectrum of flexibility options. The need for flexibility is not new. It has been traditionally 
deployed to address demand variability and uncertainty, as well as power plant and grid 
contingencies. Controllable power plants—mostly gas-fired plants and hydro dams—have been 
used to that end. However, it is inefficient and very difficult to meet the flexibility needs of 
intermittent resources from these supply-side resources only.  In this context, adding flexibility 
on the demand-side through demand response (DR) is emerging as a highly lauded and cost-
effective option for grid balancing across both temporal and geographical scales.  
DR consists of temporary shifts in electricity consumption in response to price signals or other 
financial incentives, or in reaction to grid conditions. Its early deployment aimed primarily at 
avoiding outages due to insufficient capacity during peak demand periods. This form of DR is 
often referred to as peak-shaving DR. Since 2010, in response to increasing shares of variable 
renewable electricity generation, DR has matured into a resource that can provide an 
expanded range of grid services, such as ancillary services for (i) power quality through grid 
stabilisation and renewables capacity firming, (ii) improved power reliability through 
contingency response, and (iii) better utilisation of grid and generation assets, through peak 
shaving, load leveling and load-following DR (see Figure 1).   
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 1: Conceptual illustration of key demand response applications and benefits. Source: Adapted from different sources. 
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1.1. Benefits of demand response 
As a flexibility resource, DR has a number of advantages compared to other flexibility options, 
such as peaking plants, storage and network reinforcement, particularly by leveraging the 
synergies between other flexible resources as well as market operations (see Figure 2).  
Demand response contributes to power system decarbonisation 
DR contributes to reducing overall power system emissions by displacing high-emitting 
generation units that provide baseload and peak capacity, and ancillary services. The CO2 
impact of DR is proportional to the carbon intensity of the curtailed load in case of peak-
shaving DR. In the case of ancillary services, DR displaces fossil-based generation units that are 
dedicated to providing operating reserves and regulation services. These units do not operate 
at the 7000-8760 full-load hours per year but are run at part load—ramping from 10% to 100% 
intradaily, depending on system needs—and emit more CO2 as a result. DR for ancillary 
services enables a more efficient dispatch of these generation units, lowering emissions.  
Furthermore, DR helps to absorb renewable generation peaks and troughs via shifts in 
consumption, which consists in increasing electricity consumption when renewable generation 
is high and vice versa. This is known as load-levelling or load-following DR. It reduces the 
reliance on baseload and peaking units. The resulting emissions reduction is proportional to 
the amount conventional power generation displaced.  
A 2014 study by Navigant Research3 estimates that these different forms DR could, together, 
help remove about 40 million metric tons of carbon emissions in the United States. In Europe, 
a collaborative study conducted in 20084 estimated that DR could contribute up to 25% of EU 
2020 target for CO2 emissions reductions (i.e. 100 metric tons) should DR receive full support 
from EU member states and all relevant stakeholders. Otherwise, only a third of this potential 
would be captured.  
Figure 2: The need for flexibility and the role of demand response vis-à-vis other flexibility sources. Source: CEN analysis. 
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Demand response is cost-effective from a power system perspective 
DR is a cost-effective dispatchable power system resource, often requiring little additional 
investment.5 By contrast, peaking power plants and flexible generators are capital intensive 
solutions that are only used infrequently when the grid is under stress, resulting in very 
expensive production cost per kilowatt-hour (kWh) and low-profitability. As a result, these 
generation units do not appeal to investors, raising the risk of peak and operating reserves 
capacity shortage. This problem is exacerbated by the decline in wholesale electricity prices 
that has accompanied the policy-induced deployment of intermittent renewables. In view of 
the prevailing dearth of sufficient peak and flexible capacity (except for few countries like 
Germany, Netherlands and Switzerland), many European countries such as France and Belgium 
have turned to DR.  
DR can furthermore substitute for network upgrade at least in the short run. Grid 
reinforcement is expensive and involves a high lead-time. It is also limited by social acceptance 
such as the Not In My Backyard (NIMBY) Syndrome. Wind and solar, due to their frequency and 
voltage fluctuations and intermittency, exacerbate constraints on existing transmission and 
distribution networks. Together with limitations on network upgrade, increasing wind and solar 
make active grid management an imperative. DR protocols can be used to that end. DR has 
been shown to be deployable cost-effectively using existing communication infrastructure.6 
DR’s contribution to active grid management should therefore become an integral part of 
network infrastructure planning. In effect, including DR considerations in long-range network 
and resource planning could help on two fronts, namely operational risk management and 
system resilience planning. 
DR can also be used for cross-border balancing; its potential can be gauged from the 2014 
Danish DR event. On July 9 2014, Denmark produced more than 100% of its electricity demand 
from wind farms. Cross-border DR, through interconnectors, made it possible to reduce 
renewable curtailment: 80% of the surplus was sold to Norway and Germany to be stored in 
their hydropower systems for later use. To unleash the full potential of this form of cross-
border DR, it will be necessary to invest in additional physical infrastructure, especially high-
voltage transmission lines, to accommodate the flows of power, and also to change market 
design to enable the economic transaction. 
DR boosts competition and innovation in the power sector 
DR involves a paradigm shift in the operation of power systems, whereby flexibility from 
conventional plants is replaced by shifts in consumption. The skills required for deploying DR 
differs significantly from operating traditional power plants, and are often lacking among 
incumbent utilities. From the beginning, DR development has been due to aggregators, such as 
ENERNOC.7 Increasingly, information and communication technology (ICT) providers and 
incumbent utilities, which are under the pressure to deliver flexibility optimally, are also 
developing DR capabilities. The growth of players entails more competition, which in turn, 
boosts innovation as the players try to differentiate themselves to retain or capture new 
consumers.  
1.2. Loads that provide demand response 
There are at least four types of loads8 that can deliver DR. First, optional loads relate to 
appliances that can operate at either full or limited capacity, and are typically controlled 
automatically, such as light dimming. Second, deferrable loads rely on consumers’ choice to 
adapt the consumption of an energy service (e.g. when to use the washing machine) to the 
state of the grid, e.g. through a price signal.9 Third, controllable loads, e.g. thermostatically 
controlled loads from air conditioning and refrigeration units, absorb excess wind and solar 
electricity, effectively cooling slightly below the desired temperature. Thereafter, the units 
stop consuming electricity until the temperature reverts to the desired level.10 Fourth, an 
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emerging class of load are storage loads, from electric car batteries to non-hydro utility-scale 
storage.11 
 
These different loads must be integrated in a synergistic way to derive the maximal value from 
DR, since the ability of loads to provide different types of DR (load shedding, fast DR for 
frequency and voltage control) depends on the physical properties of loads and on end-users’ 
behaviour. For instance thermostatically controlled loads are hysteretic, which imply that their 
availability for DR depends on its past and present state, e.g. a refrigeration unit that is in “on-
state” cannot be switched off if the previous state was in “off-state.” This hysteretic property 
also limits their effectiveness for fast DR, needed to respond to sudden changes in e.g. solar 
irradiation or frequency and voltage control. Relatedly, the ability of electric cars to provide 
grid-balancing services depends on the parked ratio. Presently, for real-time grid balancing 
services, large-scale storage in hydro-dams is the only mature technology, but utility-scale 
batteries are emerging as a proven technology. In addition, DR that uses distributed loads as 
well as distributed battery packs are increasingly being developed.  
1.3. Enablers of demand response 
While DR exists since the 1970s in basic forms, DR is receiving new impetus from a number of 
developments, namely (i) technological advances, (ii) conducive regulation and policy, (iii) 
cooperating consumer behaviour, (iv) new energy contracting, and (v) DR advocacy groups and 
pioneers.   
 Technological advances 
Technologies that connect the digital and physical worlds render DR non-disruptive for 
electricity consumers, and increasingly accessible to a wide range of actors, who can make 
efficient use of information technology to deploy DR for maintaining power reliability and grid 
stability. This is possible because the physics of the grid has not evolved as much as the new 
possibilities afforded by the integration of information and control technologies and other 
technologies for new ways to operate the grid.  
At the local level/scale, advances in ICT underpin the development of advanced Demand 
Response Management Systems such as Home/Building Energy Management Systems and 
flexibilisation of operations in a number of industries, e.g. energy-intensive cement industries. 
At the grid scale, the IEA Smart Grid Roadmap12 highlights that the integration of energy flow 
and information flow creates a new hybrid reality, characterised by a permanently evolving 
electrical network, with real-time, two-way flow of energy and information, between power 
generation, grid operator, and end users. This hybrid system is capable of integrating all 
traditional and new players: renewable generation units (wind and solar, whether centralised 
or decentralised), electrical vehicles, electrical storage and, thus, paves the way to smarter 
power systems.  
Importantly, smart power systems provide better visibility on consumption and distributed 
generation helps improve forecasts (minimize forecast errors) and two-way real-time 
communication assists DR in improving the optimisation of resources for reliable power-grid 
operations over time.13 Many of these digital developments are being catalysed by innovation 
in power electronics and electricity storage. In parallel, progress in security and communication 
standards facilitates large-scale automated DR (ADR) deployment. DR provides grid 
stabilisation services using and/or leveraging loads from different resources such as batteries 
and heat pumps, as well as new infrastructures such as smart charging infrastructure for 
electric vehicles. 
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 Regulation and policy 
A considerable number of policies and policy instruments, whether regulatory (e.g. laws, 
regulations and standards) or economic (e.g. taxes and subsidies) already have strong bearings 
on the governance of the power sector, from its day-to-day operations to long-term strategic 
decision-making. Stimulus packages for advancing DR development have been introduced in 
countries such as U.S., United Kingdom (UK) and France.  In the EU and the U.S., the 
importance of DR is reflected, respectively, in the European Directives—particularly the 
Electricity Directive (2009/72/EC) and the Energy Efficiency Directive (2012/27/EU)—and in the 
U.S. Energy Policy Act of 2005 as well as specific FERC rulings (e.g. FERC Orders 719, 745, 755 
and 780). They aim at removing barriers and establishing rules for DR. These policies have to 
evolve to account for behavioural changes, e.g. increase in prosumerism, and adapt to 
institutional developments, e.g. retail price deregulation.  
 Changes in consumer behaviour 
Consumer behaviour is slowly but steadily shifting in favour of DR. Price-sensitive consumers 
look for competitive prices and are willing to switch electricity providers and engage in DR if it 
entails financial savings with limited administrative burden. “Green” consumers, who actively 
seek to contribute to CO2 reductions, modify their consumption patterns, turn into producer-
consumer (prosumer) and aim to adopt electric cars. These early adopters, through peer or 
network effect, are critical for DR to diffuse more broadly. Maturation of DR will happen when 
consumers have a better understanding of the impact of their consumption decisions and of 
how they can take control of their service and associated costs.  
 New energy contracting 
The power industry is undergoing a transition towards proactive value-based energy services. 
This is driven by a number of developments in the electricity market that are putting traditional 
utilities’ business model, based on sales volume, under pressure. First, the shift in generation 
mix towards less controllable resources is either triggering or exacerbating grid reliability 
issues, driving down consumer satisfaction. Second, with increasing shares of wind and solar, 
margins in electricity markets keep eroding. Third, there is regulatory pressure of kilowatt 
savings on large consumers. Fourth, utilities are facing competition from new entrants such as 
aggregators and ICT providers.14 In this context, DR can be the piece of the puzzle to enable 
utilities to develop new value propositions for their customers, and secure sustainable revenue 
streams. 
 Demand response advocacy groups and pioneers 
Urges for DR-related reforms come primarily from advocacy groups, such as the U.S. Advanced 
Energy Management Alliance (AEMA) and the Smart Energy Demand Coalition (SEDC) in 
Europe. These advocacy groups have emerged to represent DR on policy fronts, in part, 
because incumbent utilities, which start losing revenue to DR providers, can exercise their 
market (and political) advantage to protect their interest (see Section 3.6). This includes 
utilities that have come to grip with the fact that DR and other demand-side resources could 
boost their profits by providing greater visibility on the entire power system value chain, 
offering an opportunity to improve power grid operations. The advocacy groups aim to 
preserve the integrity and competitiveness of the entire DR industry, helping unleash the full 
potential of DR and protecting the interest of small players and new entrants. Increasingly, 
TSOs are also initiating or pressing for reforms to enable faster DR deployment. Notable 
examples include the French TSO, the Réseau de Transport d’Electricité (RTE) and U.S. regional 
transmission operator, PJM Interconnection. These actors have recognised that some power 
market redesign is needed so that DR can be considered as a genuine resource by the market, 
especially in light of a historical legacy in which demand has consistently played a passive role, 
with utilities having to ensure sufficient capacity to meet demand, in a load-following way.  
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2. DEPLOYMENT STATUS AND POTENTIAL 
DR development and deployment pathways are diverse, reflecting country-specific power 
system challenges, and DR penetration is currently very heterogeneous across consumer 
segments and electricity markets.  
Figure 3 below shows the DR trends in world markets. The U.S. is the current leader of demand 
response globally. As other countries are either introducing or expanding DR programmes, this 
leadership position is likely to be eroded over the next 10 years according to a Navigant 
Research study.15 It projects that global capacity for DR will grow from 31 GW to about 200 
GW between 2014 and 2023, with the largest growth coming from Asia-Pacific, followed by 
Europe.  
 
2.1. Regional drivers  
Globally, DR has been traditionally implemented to reduce peak demand. This need for peak-
shaving DR will be sustained in the future because of increasing electricity demand that is 
driven by population growth, urbanisation, industrialisation in developing nations, and a 
general trend towards electrification of traditionally fuel-based energy uses (e.g. 
transportation, replacement of oil and gas boilers with heat pumps, and ubiquity of ICT). The 
challenge to meet rising demand is compounded by the risk of faster growth in peak demand 
relative to overall consumption (e.g. mid-morning and early evening charging peaks from 
electric vehicles, and winter peak load from heat pumps). Today, few countries have excess 
peak capacity, and growing demand may quickly exhaust any that exists, making DR a 
Figure 3: Projected evolution of demand response across the world. Source: Navigant Research (Lower-right plot); CEN Analysis (Rest of the plot). 
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compelling imperative as a cost-effective means of matching electricity demand and supply. As 
one example, faced with a capacity problem, France developed DR as a solution to its peak 
load challenge—demand peaks grew twice as fast as energy consumption between 2000 and 
2010—and, also, to promote wholesale power market liquidity.16   
As already mentioned, DR will be increasingly relied upon for load-levelling and ancillary 
services for balancing variable generation from renewable resources. Furthermore, for most 
parts of the world, particularly in North America, Asia Pacific, Europe and to a lesser extent in 
Latin America, DR is one of the priorities for smart grid development. For example, in India, DR 
is being considered as part of Buildings-to-Grid integration initiatives.17 
The effective transposition of EU Directives into Member States Regulation is a critical DR 
driver within the EU. In a recent publication, the European Commission Joint Research Center18 
categorise the Member States into three groups: (i) the laggards that are under pressure to 
take DR seriously (e.g. Portugal, Span and Italy, where the obligatory EU Directives have been 
transposed but are yet to become legally binding, (ii) the second movers (e.g., the Nordics, 
Netherlands) that are considering DR in retail markets only, whereby DR will be bundled to the 
traditional electricity provision such that DR provision will be by and large limited to traditional 
retailers or BRPs, and (iii) first movers (Belgium, France, Ireland and the UK) that have opened 
all power markets to DR and independent aggregators. 
2.2. Demand response markets 
Figure 3 shows that DR remains predominantly used for the provision of (peak) capacity 
reserves, often requiring the use of back-up generators, and for price-based and incentive-
based (i.e. economic) programmes. DR is not yet commonplace in ancillary services markets—
even if changes in electricity mix suggest an increasing need for such fast DR—and for energy 
trading.   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The increasing need for flexibility and risk management in power systems is likely to instigate a 
turnaround towards more balanced development of DR across different markets, if technical 
and regulatory challenges to implementing ancillary DR and market barriers to energy trading 
are addressed in a timely way. 
2.3. Consumer segments 
Most countries focus their DR development on commercial and industrial (C&I) consumer 
segments. There are however significant and untapped opportunities for residential DR. Two 
recent reports from Navigant Research estimate that the expected revenue from residential 
Figure 4: DR market types by region, World Markets 2Q 2013. Source: Navigant Research. 
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demand response and from C&I markets could, by 2023, respectively reach U.S. $2.3 billion19 
and U.S. $ 38 billion20 worldwide (for an expected DR capacity of about 132 GW). Residential 
DR will grow as new technologies enable the provision of advanced DR programmes, e.g. non-
disruptive direct load control (DLC) by service providers.  
In effect, a 2015 study by SIA partners estimated that the DR potential from different 
processes and loads in different sectors could correspond in absolute terms to up to 9% of the 
peak load for 34 European countries. As shown in Figure 5, 42% of this potential would come 
from the residential sector, 31% from industry and 27% from the tertiary sector.21  
This said, residential DR is likely to grow at a slower pace than C&I DR, since barriers to 
adoption tend to be higher for residential DR  (See Figure 3; Sections 3.3 and 3.4).  Figure 6 
shows that the extent to which residential DR is deployed or planned in Europe varies 
significantly across states. So do the mechanisms. In the Nordic countries, dynamic pricing is 
mandated and is the main driver of DR (see also Section 3.2, 3.3 and 4.2). Dynamic pricing is 
also envisaged in France as a next step of the French reform. Residential DR is stalled in Spain 
and Italy by a lack of dynamic pricing and consumer acceptance, respectively.22 
 
Figure 6: Residential demand response. Source: SEDC (2015). 
Figure 5: DR potential from different sources and sectors in Europe. Source: SIA Partners. 
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3. BARRIERS 
The key barriers to DR deployment can be summed up as uncertainties regarding the technical, 
economic and feasible potentials of DR. These correspond to, respectively, how much of DR 
can be provided by existing resources (encompassing physical assets, flexible operations and 
demand), to the financial viability of the technical potential, and how much of the economic 
potential can realistically be realised. Section 2 has highlighted some of the recent most 
evaluation of DR economic potential. We note that the uncertainty regarding these values is 
not shown. Furthermore, the feasible potential is stymied by lack of consumer engagement, 
inadequate investment in DR, high transaction costs, and opponents with vested interests.     
     
 
 
 
 
 
3.1. Uncertain technical potential and impact 
There is a lot of uncertainty regarding DR potential and impact due to the complexity of both 
power systems operations and advanced forms of DR. In particular, DR does not always 
translate into energy efficiency. This may create ambiguity regarding the desirability of DR. For 
instance, economically viable use of thermal loads from buildings for DR can lead to increase in 
comfort, but due to an increase in energy consumption. In this case, the increase in energy 
consumption is due to load-levelling DR that helps absorb excess renewables.23 But there are 
instances, mostly in U.S., where high-emitting behind-the-meter generators, e.g. diesel 
generator sets, are used to respond to DR events. In general, the uncertainty regarding the 
feasible potential DR and ambiguity of impact from a systems perspective may limit its 
regulatory acceptance as a desirable power system resource, and should be addressed.  
3.2. Uncertain economic potential 
DR has an uncertain economic impact, since the latter depends on the type and volumes of DR, 
as well as regulatory choices concerning DR remuneration. In the United States, DR is 
remunerated at locational marginal price (LMP) as per the FERC Order 745, which stipulates 
equal compensation for a megawatt generated and a megawatt not consumed (i.e., a 
“negawatt”). While it is true that a negawatt substitutes for a megawatt, the rationale for 
equal compensation is flawed from an economic perspective. This is because a negawatt is 
never bought in the first place, and should therefore not be remunerated.24 The reward for 
peak-shaving DR is lower electricity bill.  In effect, DR does not even have to be remunerated in 
the presence of dynamic pricing.  As a result, alternative forms of DR remuneration, 
particularly for peak shaving will emerge in other countries. Additional uncertainty comes 
technological developments, especially distributed storage, that may complement or 
substitute for DR. 
Green bars indicate the magnitude of technical, economic and feasible potentials, and grey bars reductions 
in potential relative to the technical potential and the corresponding drivers. NB: The heights of green and 
grey bars are illustrative only and not based of any quantitative analysis. 
 
 
 
              
           
                  
 
 
Figure 7: Conceptual illustration of the uncertainty regarding DR potential. Source: CEN Analysis. 
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3.3. Uncertain consumer engagement 
The long-term behavioural impact of DR together with other emerging technologies is not yet 
fully understood. Consumer fatigue or satisficing behaviour may become an issue with price-
based and incentive-based DR, unless DR is automated. Even then, consumers may be 
reluctant to relinquish control of their energy use to utilities or service providers.  In this frame, 
Opower25 suggests that residential consumers should be engaged incrementally, raising the 
levels of DR sophistication step-wise, to ensure widespread DR acceptance, particularly of 
advanced forms of DR such as DLC, which holds the promise of higher system benefits. 
Technology is not an issue; what is needed is more consumer centricity, because unless 
automated DR is implemented, consumer engagement may wane over time. 
3.4. Inadequate utilities’ investment 
Utilities have traditionally worked towards reducing OPEX and increasing return on capital 
invested, since regulation has traditionally incentivised capital investment. With DR, operations 
will become more complex, requiring innovative front- and back-office customer operations to 
engage with customers and provide reliable services. Accordingly, OPEX will increase, both in 
absolute terms and relative to CAPEX. DR requires an adaptive shift from CAPEX to OPEX mind 
set on the part of utilities.  
In addition, advanced forms of DR will operate on a common infrastructure, as captured by 
concepts such as GWAC’s “transactive energy” and Navigant’s “energy cloud.” An element that 
is often missed is the heavy investment in ICT platforms that is needed to make these happen.  
And, since these technologies have a public-good characteristic (i.e., provide benefits even to 
those who do not invest in the technology), no individual stakeholder will invest into or 
contribute to it unless appropriately rewarded.  This is exacerbated by the fact that although 
power system flexibility will require a portfolio of resources, the long-term contribution of DR 
is as yet uncertain. Unless DR generates revenues—to traditional utilities—that can be 
reinvested in advanced forms of DR, it is unlikely that DR will be developed in a timely way. 
3.5. High transaction costs 
The total transaction costs borne by DR participants and DR service providers are currently too 
high for DR to be economically viable or even feasible. Transaction costs borne by DR 
participants include the opportunity costs associated with education, qualification costs 
pertaining to telemetry and other equipment installation, energy audits, load monitoring, and 
other opportunity costs to the participant. Transaction costs to DR service providers include 
personnel costs associated with time spent on activities such as filling out a DR programme 
application, designing DR offers, and managing DR events. DR might thus fail to benefit 
residential consumers due to stringent qualification rules. Moreover, high transaction costs 
mean that aggregators favour large consumers, and marginal economic opportunities will be 
left out, even if technically they can contribute to overall DR capacity. As a result, it is difficult 
to capture the full potential of DR. 
3.6. Opponents with vested interests 
Many incumbent utilities still try to oppose the development of DR, despite the realisation that 
DR can cost-effectively address the challenges of increasing shares of renewables as well as 
new consumption peaks due to electrification.26 This particularly applies to utilities who own 
peak and flexible generating plants and who therefore view DR as a threat to their traditional 
business. Because of their incumbency, they have strong lobbying power on the regulatory 
front, which they may exploit to ensure that regulation does not move fast enough or in favour 
of DR that is provided by new players. For instance, regulation may provide longer contracts to 
traditional peak and flexible generators than to DR providers. Or, it may set minimum capacity 
requirements for market participation too high, foreclosing market to DR aggregators.  
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4. RECOMMENDATIONS: REGULATORY  
AND MARKET LEVERS  
The overarching challenge for policy makers and key market players will be to redesign the 
power market to bolster the competitive development of DR. The difficulty for restructuring 
power markets should not be underestimated, since power markets need to simultaneously 
embed flexibility on the demand side and sufficient capacity on the supply side by 
synergistically combining a range of resources, which differ in their flexibility attributes. It 
involves redefining roles and responsibilities of incumbent players and new entrants in an 
evolving market, establishing appropriate pricing at different levels, lifting market-entry 
barriers to allow for broad-based market participation and for developing competition in retail 
markets, and establishing an appropriate risk-management framework. 
4.1. Redefining roles and responsibilities 
A number of recent studies27,28,29 have highlighted the need to adapt the roles and 
responsibilities for Transmission System Operators (TSOs), Distribution System Operators 
(DSOs), Balance Responsible Parties (BRPs) in view of power system decarbonisation. In doing 
so, an integrated approach needs to be taken in view of the evolution of power systems, where 
consumers are turning into more active participants by taking on roles of prosumers or 
engaging in DR, and incumbents are losing revenues to new entrants (e.g. DR aggregators). In 
effect, the bulk of innovation in the DR landscape originates from aggregators (e.g. Comverge30 
and EnerNOC, both with established operations in the Americas, and an expanding global 
footprint), and other service providers that specialise in energy management systems, e.g. 
Honeywell, Schneider Electric, Eaton and Siemens, all of which operate internationally. The rise 
of these contenders in the electricity market is often perceived as a threat to incumbent, local 
utilities.  
Against this background, specifying framework conditions within which DSOs can safely evolve 
their operations and establish new strategic positions would limit defensive strategies on their 
part and foster more collaborative approaches, including strategic partnerships with energy 
service and ICT-service providers. A key element of such a framework design could be to foster 
DSOs’ role of coordinating the exchange of flows, both data and cash, to ensure the timely 
exchange of the right type and quality of information between partners to trigger a DR event. 
New responsibilities for DSOs could also include working together with TSOs for cross-border 
intelligent resource balancing, including DR. This involves a shift from competition to 
coordination with TSOs, effectively creating a TSO-DSO interface31 to provide, in the case of 
Europe, a pan-European balancing mechanism. 
Establishing appropriate framework conditions also include adapting the terms for balancing 
the system—a role taken by Balance Responsible Parties (BRPs)—to the new realities of power 
markets. The effectiveness of BRPs in helping with variable generation and DR can be 
enhanced by allowing them to participate in short-term, intraday markets using all possible 
resources (generation, storage and DR) in a market-based way. To the extent that this is not 
the case, TSOs should grant BRPs the possibility to balance their position up to real time in a 
technologically neutral way. Furthermore, to encourage the development of a variety of and 
reliable DR resources, the balance responsibility and costs should be borne by those 
generators that cause imbalances, including wind and solar, as long as the costs are not 
prohibitively high.32  
Going forward, incentives have to be designed in such a way that utilities deliver a minimum 
performance level, and still be able to choose to provide other value-adding services. New 
regulation for extending the role of utilities are being developed in the U.S., e.g. as part of New 
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York’s REV (Reforming the Energy Vision).33 This is particularly important since a common 
infrastructure of platform is needed to capture the full value that DR can provide to the power 
system. Incentives influence the development of valuable ownership structures for these 
platforms, through the distribution of DR value that is captured. It is equally important to 
ensure that liquidity in intraday markets and risk premiums for imbalance settlement are 
preserved, e.g. by allowing a sufficiently diverse set of players and resources to participate in 
the market. 
4.2. Enabling dynamic and transparent pricing  
The integration of an array of demand-side flexibility resources adds complexity to pricing, the 
design of which is critical because of the price sensitivity of investment, business models and 
behaviour of market participants.  To be effective, prices should reflect generation and 
network constraints and evaluate the benefits that additional resources bring to the system.  
An important first step in pricing design is the removal of retail price regulation to foster DR at 
the retail level as in the case of the Nordic countries. In most countries, retail prices are 
regulated to protect small consumers from price volatility and excessively high prices. The 
downside is a lack of pricing signals to consumers, especially at the residential level. In the 
present context, price deregulation together with DR can bolster competition in retail markets 
and may help mitigate price volatility. Furthermore, properly implemented, price deregulation 
enables the extraction of value from smart metering by allowing for smarter pricing and 
smarter contract offerings to consumers. For instance, consumers can choose, from a menu of 
contracts, different service levels and correspondingly prices, according to their reliability 
needs and risk preferences. Price deregulation thus encourages the development of new 
contractual mechanisms that ensure that costs are allocated to customers who value and are 
willing to pay for more reliable and cost-effective energy services.34 In this way, new power 
system dynamics vitiates the very raison d’être of regulated prices.  
Electricity should increasingly be priced at the locational marginal price (LMP). This is already 
the case for the wholesale electricity prices in the US. For distributed resources to provide DR, 
the distribution/retail rates must also be set such that they reflect the reliability benefits of 
their deployment. Distributed locational marginal prices are one option35 that also confer the 
advantage of facilitating the balanced treatment of distributed resources into planning 
decisions and cost allocation. LMP has the additional merit of providing regional pricing signals, 
which are important to allow for cross-border flows and market integration to build greater 
flexibility into the system.    
The next important step is to ensure efficient price discovery for DR. Auctions provide an 
efficient price discovery mechanism and some countries are already experimenting with them. 
The UK, for example, has set up the Transitional Arrangement (TA) auction as a special DR-only 
auction to bolster the integration of DR in UK capacity markets.36 This boosts the value of 
assets dedicated for other DR end-uses such as short-term operating reserves (STOR) and 
frequency response by allowing these assets to tap into multiple value streams. To ensure 
efficiency of market outcomes in such settings, multi-part bids—as implemented in Poland and 
Germany—have been shown to improve the flexibility of short-term power markets.37  
4.3. Lifting market-entry barriers 
DR must be able to compete on fair grounds with supply-side resources in all power markets to 
unleash its full potential. Similarly, all resources that are eligible for providing DR should be 
able to bid into the market. This is particularly important in view of the growth of distributed 
generation and (eventually) storage, as well as smart metering.   
 21 
To facilitate participation, especially of retail consumers, the qualification requirements for DR 
programmes need to be relaxed. The current procedures often involve tedious performance 
measurement and verification protocols that raise the transaction costs associated with DR. 
Moreover, telemetry requirements and minimum bid thresholds pre-empt the participation of 
a number of DR resources, particularly from the residential sector. By streamlining the 
eligibility criteria and approval processes, policy can help reduce transaction costs, effectively 
turning DR into an earnable asset for a broader stakeholder base.  
To ensure the participation of a broader range of loads, especially small ones, policy makers 
should ensure market entry barriers for DR aggregators are effectively lifted. On the one hand, 
aggregators should be allowed to bid as a single consumer. On the other hand, unbundling 
should be made stricter. Otherwise, market entry may effectively be deterred: as new players, 
aggregators incur significant transactions costs for consumer acquisition, and run a risk of 
losing their business to incumbent utilities, which, in the absence of unbundling, have visibility 
over the aggregators’ efforts yielding them an unfair competitive advantage. For instance, in 
Europe, there are about 2500 DSOs (~700 in Switzerland and ~800 in Germany) but only 
utilities with over 100,000 customers are strictly unbundled. At present more than 80% of 
these utilities serve less than 100,000 customers—and therefore exempt from any functional 
unbundling requirement. 
Additionally, markets may need to be opened sequentially to accommodate new DR players 
and resources depending on the current context, encompassing the technical potential of DR, 
the extent of market liberalisation, and degree of market power within each power market. 
This policy of sequential opening of markets was implemented in the case of the French 
market redesign and is particularly important for resources such as electric vehicles and heat 
pumps due to their contemporaneously low market share. Too rapid integration of new 
resources and/or market players may distort incentives, especially in view of the fact that the 
structure of the markets and emergent business models are very intertwined, and can 
adversely affect social welfare via price effects and/or ex-post market foreclosure.  
4.4. Harmonising energy policies 
Utilities’ incentive for providing DR depends on the regulation in place. DR requires intelligence 
solutions that increase operating expenses (OPEX) while some regulation, particularly cost-plus 
regulation tend to promote capital-intensive investment. In Europe only, different regulatory 
models (cost-plus regulation, cost of service regulation, performance-based or incentive-based 
regulation, price-cap and rate-of-return regulation) have been adopted, with some countries 
using a combination of models.38 Depending on the regulation currently in place, it may need 
to be revised to ensure that DR develops as a viable power system resource.  
In parallel, establishing a level playing field among different resources by revisiting the 
incentives in the energy system should be a priority. And, since the optimal operation of power 
system would require a mix of resources, integrated perspectives must be taken to align the 
incentives for different resources. For instance, DR will fail to take off in many countries in the 
absence of political mandates unless distortionary incentives such as subsidies (a form of 
negative carbon price) to coal power plants are removed. The co-existence of coal subsidies 
and feed-in-tariffs exacerbates distortions in power markets and makes it difficult to properly 
account for the potential contribution of DR. 
Last but not least, we note that European Directives such as Art 15.8 of the Energy Efficiency 
Directive (2012/27/EU) tend to be very general, and are not binding unless and until 
implemented in national laws. To ensure swift yet coordinated DR implementation, European 
policy makers should move forward with the establishment of so-called Network Codes for DR. 
Network codes are a set of rules that govern the actions of technology suppliers and grid 
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levels 
• Uncertainty regarding technical, economic and 
feasible potential 
• Uncertainty regarding technical, economic and 
feasible potential 
Barriers addressed Specific objectives  Recommendations 
operators and determine how access is given to users. They have the advantage of being 
immediately applicable and provide regulatory certainty. DR falls under the umbrella of the 
Network Code for Electricity Balancing (NCEB), but further refinements are needed to the 
NCEB to bolster DR.39  
4.5. Adopting a risk management approach  
The many uncertainties regarding DR potential, trade-offs and risks involved may prevent its 
timely development. The following three steps could help better manage risks associated with 
DR development and deployment: 
Step 1: Establish and promote the use of standardised and independent ex-ante protocols and 
tools to evaluate the technical potential for DR. Robust estimates of DR potential are necessary 
to help design appropriate policies and regulation, prioritise investments, and make other 
strategic decisions. In particular, standardised tools will reduce the risk for small and medium-
sized projects.  
Step 2a: Assess the technical risks associated with DR projects upfront, ensuring that they are 
well communicated between DR service providers, investors and/or participants. 
Step 2b: Identify and address the obstacles to a cost-effective deployment of DR. 
Step 3: Address residual risks via contractual risk transfer mechanisms such as insurance 
against business interruption risks, particularly relevant in the case of C&I DR, or asset 
performance risks.  
These steps will increase participants’ confidence in DR projects’ and protect them against 
potential downsides, and should accordingly encourage DR uptake from bottom-up.  
4.6. Summary of recommendations  
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5. CONCLUSION 
The societal value of DR is increasingly recognised by many institutions, which also claim that 
DR is needed for energy transitions. However, the pace at which DR is being deployed remains 
slow. The future of power systems is open; the landscape will be defined by prosumers and 
other actors competing to provide an array of flexibility services. There is a window of 
opportunity to influence the future of power systems and to leverage the system value of DR. 
Going forward, it is firstly important to put in place a holistic approach and a unifying 
framework for assessing the added value of DR to future power systems. The emerging power 
system can be best seen as a hybrid system that brings together all loads, generation sources 
and storage capability in a synergistic way, albeit at the cost of increasing power system 
complexity.  
Secondly, value extraction from this mix of heterogeneous resources hinges around sound 
market redesign that takes into account the physics of power generation and distribution, but 
also the innovative ownership schemes that seek to change the modus operandi of power 
systems. When considering power system reforms and investment needs, it is imperative to 
avoid the pitfall of myopia and consider that: 
a) Technologies are evolving that would leverage the potential of DR across a broad range of 
resources from buildings energy management to electric vehicle storage. Uncertainties 
regarding the evolution of the technologies and associated DR capacity should be handled 
appropriately in power system planning. 
b) Markets are opening up that facilitate the participation of a broader range of actors. In 
Europe, for example, market coupling opens up the geographical scope of DR from 
national to a pan-European level. This contraction in space is not only a market design 
issue but also a network investment issue.  
c) Increased frequency and severity of extreme events related to climate change increase the 
exposure of power systems to supply disruptions. DR can contribute towards increasing 
the resilience of power systems.  
Thirdly, it is quintessential to strive for a judicious combination of market mechanism and 
regulation to foster DR. Market-only solutions are often not sufficient in view of the presence 
of market failures such as transaction costs. For example, in California (one of the leaders of DR 
in the U.S. and globally), DR growth was fuelled by a number of events and generous political 
support. The latter has subsided thereafter. Evidence from U.S. and some parts of Europe 
indicate that government support for DR is instrumental for DR to take off. But, over-reliance 
on regulation and policy means that effective development of DR can be stalled as political 
priorities shift. A regime that combines the strengths of market-oriented and regulatory 
initiatives seems to be more appropriate, especially in the early stages of development and 
deployment, during which some incumbent players will be destabilised and may need to be 
compensated. 
Future power systems will be open, modular, diversified and with sufficient redundancy for 
enhanced resilience. In such systems, each resource is represented as a node in the system 
that can be switched on or off depending on the state of the grid and subject to the constraints 
of the laws of physics. In it, DR is perhaps the lowest hanging fruit that acts as a linchpin both 
during and after power system transformation. 
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GLOSSARY 
Balance Response Party (BRP) A BRP is responsible for ensuring that the supply of energy 
corresponds to the anticipated consumption of energy in its balance area during a given 
time period and financially regulates for any imbalance that arises. 
DR aggregators are new entities in the electricity market that act as brokers between end-
customers and the utility operator. They combine the electricity demand of two or more 
customers into a single purchasing unit to negotiate with electricity providers. They may be 
responsible for installing the relevant technology (e.g. smart meters) at end-user premises 
to be able to manage electricity demand in their portfolio.  They receive monetary rewards 
from utility operators for doing so and reward end-users for the provision of demand 
flexibility. 
Energy Cloud is a term used by Navigant to describe the emerging two-way connected 
digitized grid, with more distributed and variable energy resources, highlighting the 
changing power system landscape from a one-way system from generation to distribution. 
(https://www.navigantresearch.com/research/the-energy-cloud)  
Power market liquidity is an important indicator of the effectiveness of wholesale 
electricity market competition. A liquid market is characterised by the presence of a large 
number of buyers and sellers that transact at all times and in which no single transaction 
can cause major changes in prices. (https://www.ofgem.gov.uk/electricity/wholesale-
market/liquidity)  
Power system flexibility expresses the extent to which a power system can smooth out 
fluctuations in electricity demand and production, including but not limited to 
increasing/decreasing electricity production or consumption in response to variability, 
expected or other otherwise (i.e., under uncertainty). 
Transactive Energy is a concept introduced by GridWise Architecture Council to denote 
“techniques for managing the generation, consumption or flow of electric power within an 
electric power system through the use of economic or market-based constructs while 
considering grid reliability constraints,” considering the fact that decision-making is based 
on some value preferences.  (http://www.gridwiseac.org/about/transactive_energy.aspx)  
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